Systematic design for intersection attack resistance in practical anonymity Networks exposes users to intersection attacks. Linkable to each other but not to the sender - but pseudonymity in dynamic Users in practice often need pseudonymity - sending messages intentionally Network surveillance - but only if all messages are independent and unlinkable. Some anonymity schemes might in principle protect users from pervasive In addition, our evaluation demonstrates that APAC can achieve desired performance gains. Our anonymity analysis shows that our APAC design can preserve a higher level of anonymity than state-of-the-art peer-assisted CDNs. APAC can be a web service, compatible with current browsers and requiring no client-side changes. To alleviate this, we propose an anonymous peer-assisted CDN (APAC), which employs content delivery while providing initiator anonymity (i.e., hiding who sends the resource request) and responder anonymity (i.e., hiding who responds to the request) for peers. In this work, we show that the current designs of peer-assisted CDNs expose clients to privacy-invasive attacks, enabling one client to infer the set of browsed resources of another client. Peer-assisted CDNs bring significant bandwidth savings to website operators and reduce network latency for users. The peer-assisted CDN is a new content distribution paradigm supported by CDNs (e.g., Akamai), which enables clients to cache and distribute web content on behalf of a website.

Annonymous bittorrent